INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The purpose of this report is to document information relating to the investigation and repair of the defects in the baffle plates of the HFBR primary heat exchangers. The defects were first discovered during an extended reactor shutdown which had been scheduled to permit inspection of several components in the primary piping system. This inspection was part of the search for the source of metallic chips that had been recovered from fuel elements during the past year.
It is useful at this point to describe the two primary exchangers in some detail. They are U-tube exchangers, mounted in the horizontal position and have a length and outside diameter of 27 ft. and 56 in.
respectively. Do 0 * the tube-si.f'e fluid, is cooled by cooling tower water, the shell-side fluid. As can be seen in Figs. 1 and 2, the D2O enters each exchanger through the lower nozzle, passes through the U-tubes and leaves through the upper nozzle. The inlet and outlet nozzles fit into the end of the exchanger shell which has the hemispherical head. The baffle plate separates the inlet and outlet plenum regions in the hemispherical head and serves to prevent D£0 from bypassing the tubus. At rated flow, the pressure drop through the exchanger tubes is 10 psi and consequently the differential pressure across the baffle plate is also approximately 10 psi. Table 1 gives additional data on thrj exchangers.
The inital visual inspection of the plates during the extended shutdown showed weld cracks and missing weld material along the junction of the baffle plate and tube sheet. Further investigation, including dye penetrant testing, radiography and photography revealed the following:
1. In the B exchanger, the fillet weld around the periphery of the plate had cracked everywhere except at the corners of the plate where the tube-sheet meets the hemispherical head. In addition, several cracks were evident in the plate itself.
2. In the A exchanger, the fillet weld had cracked all along the plate to tube-sheet junction except in the vicinity of the corners of the plate. The weld at the junction between the head and plate was intact and there was no evidence of cracks in the plate.
3. There is more than enough missing weld'material to account for the metallic chips that have been recovered. In addition, the vreld material specified in the exchanger fabrication drawing, is the same as that determined by chemical analysis of one of the recovered chips.
Each baffle plate is subject to a static load, due to the differential pressure across the plate and to vibration which is induced by primary pump excitation. The evidence suggests that these two effects in combination with a poor plate to tube-sheet weld, resulted in failure of the plate by fatigue. Thermal stresses, caused by the difference in the DjO temperatures in contact with the two exposed surfaces of the plate are not large enough to be significant.
Repair of the.plate by rewelding the defective fillet welds was ruled out because of space limitations and the possibility of damaging some tube to tube-sheet joints. Instead a structure was designed to support and stiffen the plate. The structure is shown in Figures 3 and 4 . The two vertical 1-1/4" diameter rods transmit the static load on the plate to the shell. These bars are welded to the shell and bolted to the plate.
The stiffening members, which are bolted to and capture the plate, increase the natural frequency of the plate so as to minimize resonance with the driving frequency produced by the pump. T'-is supporting structure in exchanger B is more elaborate than that in A because of the greater damage in B. Holes of 1/4" diameter were drilled at the tips of the cracks in the plate in exchanger B in order to prevent crack propagation.
Essentially all parts of the structure are type 316 stainless steel (0.06% max. carbon), a material which is compatible vrith primary D2O and with other materials in the system. Recognized quality assurance procedures were employed in connection with materials, welder qualification, welding and weld inspection.
Although the proposed design is conservative, it was necessary to determine if continued deterioration of the baffle plate will lead to consequences that have not been foreseen in the HFBR Safety Analysis Report. One of the principal consequences is that a plate fragment will break loose and damage the thermowells in the primary piping causing a loss of D2O. Another result is that a plate fragment"-may Tqgvrse. blockage . Following the visual inspection, radiography and dye penetrant tests were done to provide further information on the extent of damage. In exchanger 3, radiographs were taken of the pi. .e cracks and of the bottom fillet weld that joins the plate to the hemispherical head. It ha-1 been anticipated that these radiographs might be of questionable value here because of poor geometry and accessibility. When the initial results proved inconclusive, radiography was discontinued.
The dye penetrant test was made by applying the dye penetrant to the top and the developer to the bottom of the baffle plate. In exchanger A the results confirmed the failure of the fillet welds that join the baffle plate to tube sheet. There were no cracks evident in the plate and the plate to hemispherical head welds appeared to be in good condition.
In exchanger B the tests verified the failure of the fillet welds that join the baffle plate to tube-sheet and delineated the cracks in the plate (see photograph 1-47-70). The test also indicated that the fillet welds that join the plate to the hemispherical head had failed. These welds were still firmly attached to the hemispherical head but had separated from the plate along most of its length (see Photograph 1-12-70).
PROBABLE CAUSE OF FAILURE
The most probable cause of failure of the baffle plates is fatigue due to plate vibration superimposed on top of a high static load. It is apparent that the failure occurred initially in both the A and B heat exchangers along the fillet welds between the 3/8 in.-thick baffle plate and the tube-sheet. The failure in the A exchanger did not progress beyond that condition while in the B exchanger the cracks propagated into the plate itself and the peripheral fillet welds between the plate and the hemispherical head also cracked.
In the fabrication of the exchangers a 2-1/4" wide strip was first fillet welded to the tube-sheet cladding while the semicircular portion of the plate was welded into the hemispherical head. The head was then joined to the tube-sheet with a circumferential full penetration weld.
The final weld in the baffle plate, a full-penetration butt weld between the strip and the semicircular plate was made through the nozzles in the head. There is some evidence of lnck of fusion in the fillet weld between the strip and the tube-sheet. This weld bead was laid in rather lightly; diameter pins that fit with .015 in. diametrical clearance into the stiffening structure. These rods act in shear and, as is the case in the A exchanger, each is oversized with respect to the load it must carry. The slip fit into the stiffening structure is provided in order -7 -to avoid a condition where differential thermal effects in the structure could accumulate and strain the very short active length of the pins.
The resonant frequency of the unsupported portion of the plate is pbout 300 cps. All four bolted joints include Inconel-X Belleville wash-rs.
In order to prevent further propagation of the existing cracks in 'the baffle plate, 1/4 in. diameter holes are drilled at the crack tips.
Quality Assurance Procedures 1. Material: All plate and rod materials are type 316 stainless steel with less than .06% C. This alloy was selected because it is superior to type 304 in crevice corrosion. Since the repair will create many crevices in the threads and nuts and against plates, the better material was specified The quality standard setup for the examination was that any indication of lack of fusion or discontinuity, and any inclusions or porosity exceeding that allowed in the code (Q21B) were causes for rejection.
A qualified welder was allowed to practice on a mocked up joint of the same geometry as the support rod to exchanger head. Before a welder was allowed to weld on the heat exchanger, he had to demonstrate that he could produce an acceptable joint in the overhead position. The submitted joint was dye checked, radiographed and cut for metallographic examination. The quality standard for acceptance is as stated above for the qualification test plate.
b. Procedure: All welding was performed by the tungsten inert gas shielded arc process. The filler rod used was that; of type 308. Backup gas was provided on the inside of the head.
The weld joint design is shown in Fig. 5 . :
c. Weld Inspection: The first two passes of all welds were checked with dye penetrant. Any indication of cracks, laps, pits, or porosity was ground out and repaired. After the first and second passes, the welds from the inside of the head were examined to be sure that ''\z cover gas was adequate, that there was good penetration and that there was no indication of dirty weld or porosities before the welding was allowed to proceed. All completed welds were radiographed and dye checked at the inside of the head. Any indication of porosity or questionable spots as indicated by the dye check was ground out. These examinations show that there was some pull back at spots of the plate due to weld metal shrinkage. These spots were ground to give a smooth blending in of the weld metal and the head material. The acceptance standard for the welds were guided by Section VIII of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE OF BAFFLE PLATE
The proposed repairs were designed to insure that further deterioration of the baffle plate does not take place. However, the possibility of continuing failure cannot be completely discounted, so that it is only prudent to consider the hazards as they affect reactor safetyr, Tlnsse-.hazards relate to the breaking and detachment of a fragment of the plate itself rather than to the less significant loss of cracked weld material around the periphery of the plate.
Flow Effects
The detached plate fragment may cause a reduction in the total core flow by becoming jammed in the primary exchanger exit nozzle or in the piping between the exchanger and thr reactor vessel. A flow reduction would be detected by the flow instrumentation and would cause automatic reactor shutdown if the scram point was reached. It is not possible to visualize a complete loss of flow situation because even'in the remote circumstance of failure of the baffle plates in both exchangers with complete blockage in each line, the shutdown pump will cool the core.
If the detached fragment does not cause flow blockage, the flow will increase rather than decrease. This will occur because some flow will bypass the tubes in the exchanger, creating a reduced pressure loss across the exchanger and causing the primary pump to seek an operating point further out on the head-capacity curve. It has been estimated that the maximum possible increase in total primary flow, assuming complete bypassing of the exchanger, is about 5%. This flow increase is not hazardous.
Fuel Element Water Channel Blockage
A fragment of a baffle plate may be carried into the reactor vessel and fall on top of or into a fuel element. The design of the inlet end of the fuel element, with its triangular ears and lifting bail, is such that it is highly unlikely that a baffle plate fragment could completely block flow to an element. In this connection, calculations recently reported* have shown that it is necessary Co reduce the flow velocity in both channels adjacent to the hottest fuel plate by a factor of more than 2 to cause bi'rnout at the hottest point in that plate. In order to achieve more extensive burnout covering several fuel plates, where the average heat fluxes are about 1/3 of the peak value, it is required that the flow be reduced by substantially more than the factor of 2 cited above.
One of the accidents** treated in the SAR was a fual element flow blockage situation involving the complete meltdown of an element. This accident is more severe than any one likely to result from a baffle plate *Memo from P. Tichler, dated Nov. 24, 1969, entitled "EffeC" of Fuel Element Blockage on HFBR Core Thermal Analysis" **BNL-7661, p. 14-10, Plugged Water Channels in Fuel Element failure.
Water Temperature Effects
When the primary exchanger tubes are partially bypassed by flov through tha opening in the baffle plate,, the heat removal capabili y of the exchanger will be reduced and the primary water temperature will rise. If the opening is large enough, the performance of the exchanger will be reduced to a point where the water temperature at the core inlet will reach the setback level and the reactor will shutdown. No hazard is seen here. On the other hand, it is conceivable that damage to a temperature element may occur without leakage of D£0. The temperature instrument will respond with a sudden change in indication and there may or may not be a high temperature alarm depending on the mode of failure. However, until the fault is discovered, the core inlet temperature continues to be monitored by the undamaged temperature elements.
*BNL-766i, p. 14-12, Primary system rupture 
